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Abstract—Verification of data generated by wearable sensors
is increasingly becoming of concern to health service providers
and insurance companies. There is a need for a verification
framework that various authorities can request a verification
service for the local network data of a target IoT device. In
this paper, we leverage blockchain as a distributed platform to
realize an on-demand verification scheme. This allows authorities
to automatically transact with connected devices for witnessing
services. A public request is made for witness statements on the
data of a target IoT that is transmitted on its local network, and
subsequently, devices (in close vicinity of the target IoT) offer
witnessing service.
Our contributions are threefold: (1) We develop a system
architecture based on blockchain and smart contract that enables
authorities to dynamically avail a verification service for data
of a subject device from a distributed set of witnesses which
are willing to provide (in a privacy-preserving manner) their
local wireless measurement in exchange of monetary return;
(2) We then develop a method to optimally select witnesses in
such a way that the verification error is minimized subject to
monetary cost constraints; (3) Lastly, we evaluate the efficacy
of our scheme using real Wi-Fi session traces collected from
a five-storeyed building with more than thirty access points,
representative of a hospital. According to the current pricing
schedule of the Ethereum public blockchain, our scheme enables
healthcare authorities to verify data transmitted from a typical
wearable device with the verification error of the order 0.01%
at cost of less than two dollars for one-hour witnessing service.
Index Terms—IoT, data witnessing, blockchain, optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN healthcare systems are increasingly comingonline. Wearable devices have profoundly improved
patients experience of interacting with remote healthcare
providers. They facilitate remote healthcare monitoring given
their capability in automatic measurement of medical signs and
periodic transmission of data over the Internet. Received medi-
cal data will be stored on a cloud server where different author-
ities can access data and take appropriate actions. Healthcare
systems benefit from wearable devices to provide a higher
quality of care to citizens, improved decision making, accurate
real-time diagnosis, and timely treatment at considerably lower
prices [1], [2]. Many insurance companies have also developed
policies based on the customers medical information received
from wearable IoTs [3].
Automated and online health services driven by new wear-
able technologies, while revolutionizing the traditional health
M. H. Chinaei, H. Habibi Gharakheili, and V. Sivaraman are with the
School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New
South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia (e-mails: m.chinaei@unsw.edu.au,
h.habibi@unsw.edu.au, vijay@unsw.edu.au).
systems, come at a price of frequent and sophisticated cy-
ber threats [4], [5], [6]. Wearable device users, themselves,
sometimes become potential attackers when they try to forge
data transmitted from their health sensor to claim pecuniary
benefits [7]. An adversary, even located at far physical distance
from a target wearable device, can maliciously manipulate
data packets transmitted from the sensor to falsify its sensitive
information. Attackers may attempt to manipulate the data
transmitted from a health sensor such as an insulin pump, caus-
ing the patient to receive a lethal dose of medicine [8]. More
worryingly, most of these attacks would remain undetected as
neither the victim device nor the healthcare server is aware
of an adversary in the middle of their communications. The
largely scattered distribution of IoT-dependent patients cou-
pled with poor security measures embedded in devices make
wearables even more appealing victims to attackers who target
health data authenticity and integrity. This poses massive risks
to the entire healthcare data-centric system where practitioners
medical decisions and many other analytical processes would
rely solely on the accuracy and validity of data measured by
wearable sensors and transmitted via the Internet.
Any discrepancy in data, between what is transmitted by
the sensor and what is received by the healthcare system,
warrants further investigation to check whether data is forged
or tampered with. Therefore, obtaining the local version of
data (i.e., transmitted by wireless sensors) is crucial for verifi-
cation. Neighboring nodes (those sharing a wireless broadcast
domain with the target IoT sensor) can potentially provide a
local version of its transmitted data – we call these neighboring
nodes as “witnesses”. The witnesses are wireless devices that
overhear data packets transmitted by the IoT sensor, and
hence can record the local version of the data whenever
needed (on-demand witnessing). The concept of crowdsourced
secure logging for wearable devices was first proposed in
[9], where wireless IoT sensors in an environment (within
close proximity) statically overhear and record a fingerprint of
other sensors’ data, allowing a forensic expert to verify data
transmitted from the sensors retrospectively. While proposing
a novel idea, their scheme suffers from a number of issues
including: (a) local network gateway presents a single point
of failure, and hence difficult to scale; (b) the identity of wit-
nesses is revealed, raising privacy concerns; and (c) witnesses
lack incentives to statically participate in an opportunistic col-
lection of witness records. To address these shortcomings we
develop a dynamic scheme that allows authorities to publicly
request for witnessing of data transmitted by a target sensor,
and incentivized witnesses to collect and submit their local
records in a privacy-preserving manner. In order to develop a
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2practical scheme for data witnessing and verification, certain
requirements are to be met:
Secure and private logging: Witnesses record data packets
from the target device and securely log them into their state-
ments transmitted to and stored in a tamper-proof database for
an admissible auditing. More importantly, statements should
protect the privacy of witnesses (not revealing the identity and
location of witnesses).
Dynamic witnessing: Witnessing incurs computing costs,
and hence should be performed judiciously and dynamically
as opposed to statically. The Health Service Providers (HSP)
queries over a distributed service platform for witness state-
ments corresponding to a target device whenever needed. The
query is seen by potential witnesses that have subscribed to
this service platform. Those witnesses which are in close
vicinity of the target sensor may choose to contribute to this
process by giving statements at certain resolution – higher
resolutions incur heavier computing costs.
Monetization: A potential witness has little incentives
to participate in a witnessing process, incurring power and
computing costs, unless there is a monetary return. HSPs
potentially have the ability to pay; however, they need a sys-
tematic method that allows them to make dynamic decisions
in choosing the right witnesses which meet their requirements
while aligning with their budget. The HSP would choose
certain witnesses (from a set of available ones) that yield
the best verification subject to a budget constraint, and this
selection can vary dynamically depending on the availability
of witnesses in the environment and their ability in generating
statements of certain resolutions.
Most of the previous works in the area of witnessing [10]
focused on the first requirement above (i.e., secure logging)
in a variety of scenarios, while the other two essentials have
been overlooked or poorly addressed. In this paper we use
blockchain technology as a platform that connects individ-
ual witnesses to health authorities, enabling both parties to
communicate, interact, and transact dynamically. Blockchain
is widely perceived as an immutable, distributed, and decen-
tralized database which is automatically updated by transac-
tions via consensus (agreement) among participants (peers).
Recently, blockchain in conjunction with automatic executable
programs (aka “smart contracts” [11]) has enabled a medium
for trading assets between untrusted parties. The distributed
untrusted parties can communicate, negotiate, and establish
a contract to trade their assets/services over the blockchain
without any third-party intervention, while gaining the same
functionality with a decent amount of certainty compared to
centralized networks [12]. Providing an immutable, shared,
and real-time ledger along with enabling trustless transactions
among individual peers motivate us to develop our witnessing
scheme on a blockchain platform.
This paper describes a novel witnessing solution that allows
healthcare authorities to remotely and dynamically verify the
data received from health IoT sensors. Witnessing requests
are publicly Thanks to the blockchain technology and smart
contracts, the healthcare authorities could request from any
wireless device in the vicinity of the IoT sensor to overhear and
record the local version of the data transmitted wirelessly by
the device. The witnesses could securely make their statements
based on the packets they are overhearing from the IoT device
to provide the witness statements. Smart contracts on top of
the blockchain network would allow witnesses to trade their
statements with the healthcare service provider (HSP) in a
privacy preserved manner without relying on trusted third
parties. As a result, the HSP using witness statements would be
able to find out any discrepancies between the data delivered
to the healthcare cloud and the local version.
Our contributions are threefold: (1) We develop a system ar-
chitecture based on blockchain and smart contract that enables
authorities to dynamically avail a verification service for data
of a subject device from a distributed set of witnesses which
are willing to provide (in a privacy-preserving manner) their
local wireless measurement in exchange of monetary return;
(2) We then develop a method to optimally select witnesses in
such a way that the verification error is minimized subject to
monetary cost constraints; (3) Lastly, we evaluate the efficacy
of our scheme using real Wi-Fi session traces collected from
a five-storeyed building with more than thirty access points,
representative of a hospital. According to the current pricing
schedule of the Ethereum public blockchain, our scheme
enables healthcare authorities to verify data transmitted from a
typical wearable device with the verification error of the order
0.01% at cost of less than two dollars for one-hour witnessing
service.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: §II describes
prior work on witnessing, data logging, and blockchain use-
cases in data provenance, and §III describes our solution
approach that systematically and dynamically makes use of
smart contracts for distributed witnessing. In §IV we describe
our optimization framework to select witnesses, while in §V
we evaluate the efficacy of our scheme via simulation. The
paper is concluded in §VI.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper lies at the intersection of three strands of
research works including intrusion detection systems (IDS),
secure logging, and application of blockchain/smart-contract
technologies.
Firstly, we emphasize that our objective is not to develop
intrusion detection (IDS) method for IoTs, but alarms of a
network IDS can be used to trigger our process of data verifica-
tion. Secondly, we look at secure logging methods to maintain
audit trail and discuss witnessing protocols that are close to our
work. Thirdly, we highlight the application of blockchain and
smart contract technologies in data provenance, access control
management, and how our scheme differs from existing works.
A. IDS for IoTs
Intrusion detection systems monitor network traffic and
often look for signature of malicious in traditional networks
defined as monitoring the network components to detect any
security violation. The IDS enables the auditor to detect abnor-
mal behaviors in a network or system, highlighting possible
compromised devices or cyber-attacks [14]. IDS in the IoT
context would be different from the traditional use cases as it
3deals with very low-power devices on a very large scale, which
shares data among objects and users [15]. The strategies for
IDS in IoT could be categorized based on different attributes,
namely, IDS placement strategies, detection methods, and
security threats. Interested readers may want to refer to these
comprehensive surveys of IDS in IoT context [16], [17], [18].
In [19], we proposed a network-based IDS for IoTs using
manufacturer usage descriptions (MUD) and software-defined
network (SDN) paradigm to translate formal behavioral pro-
files of off-the-shelf sensors to static and dynamic flow rules
that can be enforced at run-time by the network administrator.
Any sensor which its traffic deviates from the formal behav-
ior would be detected as a potential intruder. This scheme
is categorized as centralized IDS, which uses a hybrid of
anomaly/signature-based methods to detect volumetric attacks,
including reflection/amplification, flooding, ARP spoofing, and
port scanning.
Our proposed witnessing service for verifying healthcare
data in this paper differentiates from the IDS for IoT literature
in different aspects. First, our work is not to detect the
intrusion but could benefit from the IDS as an alarm, which
forces the health authorities to run data verification service.
Our service is placed in the cloud of the health authorities,
not in the network administrator. Second, our system is an
on-demand service to detect any attacks on the integrity and
authenticity of data, in other words. While the IDS literature
discussed above to inspect the sensor’s traffic patterns to
detect abnormal behaviors, we want to detect any discrepancy
between the version of data transmitted from the sensor and
the version delivered to the health cloud.
B. Secure logging
Log data in traditional systems are designed to record
any event that changes the state of the system and would
provide authorities to reconstruct the chains of events. The
audit records may be used as digital evidence. The audit-
ing architecture traditionally consists of three primary roles:
dedicated devices that capture audit records, collectors who
store these records, and an auditor who retrieves the collected
data and retroactively investigates the records to detect any
suspicious activity. Various secure logging methods have been
proposed in both capturing and storing phases to fulfill the
requirements of logging audit records as admissible evidence
[10]. In the following, we briefly discuss important works that
address more security requirements.
In [20], authors consider a secure logging architecture in
which the audit logs would be stored on an untrusted machine
in the storage phase. They proposed a scheme based on hash
chains and evolving shared cryptographic keys to limit the
attacker’s ability to read and alter the audit logs. The shared
key in each epoch is derived from the hash of the previous
data logs. Therefore, when an attacker could break one of
the shared keys, he only would be able to change audit logs
for that specific epoch. Any audit log manipulation would be
detectable because the shared keys for the next epochs have
been made using the original version of the audit log. The
major drawback is that any verifier needs to posses the shared
key of epoch to verify the authenticity of audit logs. This
issue has been addressed by Logcrypt [21], where the author
proposed using public key encryption, which enables the audit
log to be signed by one entity and be verifiable to anyone else
without revealing the secrets.
Authors in [22], while pointing out the security attacks
which the previous works are vulnerable to, propose a se-
cure logging architecture based on Forward-Secure Sequential
Aggregate (FssAgg) authentication techniques. Their proposed
scheme takes a private key, a message to be signed, and the
aggregated signature computed up to this point to compute
a new aggregate signature. Their evaluation shows that this
scheme provides better security while incurring less computa-
tional and communication overhead. All of the schemes above
need either predefined powerful audit generators in the vicinity
of the IoT sensor or very high computational power at the
sensor itself to digitally sign its audit logs and transmit them
to the authorities. None of them would be applicable in the IoT
context due to the large scale of these energy-poor devices.
1) Witnessing: To the best of our knowledge, witnessing
as an approach to seek assistance from the neighboring nodes
has mostly been applied in the location proof systems. In
[23], authors propose APPLAUS a privacy-preserving location
proof system that enables different verifiers to verify a node’s
location based on the proofs collected from the witnesses in the
environment. All of the parties, including the prover node and
witnesses, should register with a certification authority (CA)
to obtain secrets for signing the proofs. Any node registered
in the system and equipped with the Bluetooth technology
could ask all available witnesses in the environment to provide
him a location proof and forward these proofs to a central
proof server where an authorized verifier could query and
retrieve location proofs from. To protect real identities of dif-
ferent parties(nodes and witnesses) from each other and from
location proof server, The CA uses a pseudonym approach
that provides each user with a set of private/public key pairs.
Authors in [24] propose an improved scheme named STAMP
based on a unique pair of public/private key and commitment
techniques instead of periodically changed pseudonyms. They
also remove the untrusted central proof server to perform better
collusion detection.
In [25], authors propose WORAL as a witness oriented
provenance framework for secure location proofs of the mobile
devices. In this scenario, each physical region has a designated
location authority, and a set of mobile users, which could
play the role of volunteer witnesses, or a user needs to prove
her location. Witnesses provide notarization of a statement
between the user and location authorities of an environment.
The devices have local storage for storing these provenance
items, which is fully controlled by its user, which could
partially or entirely provide them to different applications that
asked for location proofs. All of the aforementioned papers are
in the context of secure location proofs. In our scenario, we
need the witnesses to provide health authorities with a compact
local version of the data transmitted from the IoT sensor. We
can not rely on the location authorities as it needs predefined
static structures on a very large scale to cover all of the
sensors. On the other hand, we can not incur the computational
4and communication power of generating periodic signatures or
commitment techniques to the ultra-low-power sensorsalso, all
of these methods lack a monetization scheme to incentivize the
witnesses.
The authors in [9] propose an algorithm of witnessing for
secure logging and forensics of medical data. They assume
that while a sensor is communicating with its associated
gateway, the other sensors could overhear the data packets. The
witnesses (neighboring sensors communicating with the same
gateway) in the vicinity of a sensor log any communication
packets occurred between the gateway and the sensor in their
bloom filters as an efficient mechanism to keep the fingerprint
of the sensor’s data packets. At the end of the epoch, witnesses
would upload their bloom filters in a central forensic server,
and the gateway would send the list of witnesses to the forensic
server.
Their scheme, while proposing a novel application of wit-
nessing, suffers from severe vulnerabilities regarding security
and implementation. First, their scheme would disclose the
location of the gateway, witnesses, and the sensor to a third
party, compromising the privacy of all entities contributing to
the scheme. Second, this protocol suffers from a single point of
failure since the gateway in the environment could easily cheat
in sending the list of witnesses to the central server. Third,
their scheme does not scale. It needs different authorities such
as servers of the witnesses, Telco server, and the healthcare
server, to pre-coordinate with each other. Four, the witnesses
are not incentivized to contribute to the scheme.
C. Blockchain
The emerging blockchain technology and smart contract on
top of it provide a shared, distributed database governed by
a consensus algorithm, not a single authority. The majority
of the network would decide upon accepting new events and
chain them to the rest of the history (previous events). The
cryptographic structure of the data stored on the blockchain
and the enormous amount of power needed to reach an
agreement between different peers makes the Blockchain
tamper-proof against adversaries. The decentralized control
and immutability of the blockchain make it a viable approach
to develop trusted systems [26].
Smart contracts are pre-defined contractual terms written
in the form of digital scripts which are executed if certain
conditions are met. While traditional blockchains like bit-
coin support only cryptocurrency transactions, more advanced
Blockchain like Ethereum support smart contracts providing
individual users with the opportunity to self-enforce their
protocols to transfer different assets [11].
Blockchain as a tamper-proof database has many capabil-
ities to support data provenance, which defines as meta-data
that keeps track of data transformation and its ownership from
the source it is originated to its current shape [27]. In [28],
authors devise a scheme based on smart contracts to track the
changes made to a document while it is stored on the cloud.
It would record different parties’ actions to change the data
and store the records on the blockchain using smart contracts.
The proposed architecture in [29] using on-chain voting smart
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Fig. 1. Threat model: forging IoT data in transit by man-in-the-middle.
contract protects the document against unauthorized users or
changes that are not verified by the majority of authorized
users.
Another use-case of Blockchain in the literature is for access
control management. The shared distributed nature of the
Blockchain would facilitate access control management. One
of the best papers in this field is [30], in which authors use the
Blockchain technology to provide an access control framework
for IoT devices. Their framework uses the transactions on the
shared ledger to grant, get, revoke, and delegate access in the
IoT applications. They emphasize on the rights of individual
users as owner of the data and use the shared ledger of the
Blockchain as an immutable, tamper-proof database which
enables the user of the sensor to get access to different parties.
We use Blockchain in a different context to reach different
aims. Our scheme differs from the previous papers in the area
of Blockchain as it develops a dynamic witnessing algorithm
that allows witnesses colocated with the health wearable
device to contribute and provide the healthcare system with
the local version of the data. The local versions of the data
would be considered an asset to the healthcare provider to
discover security attacks on data integrity and authenticity.
We have utilized smart contracts for trading multiple assets
(witness statements and cryptocurrencies) on the Blockchain
without reliance on an authorized third party.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND ALGORITHM
In this section, we develop our system architecture for
an on-demand auditing of wearable data using distributed
witness statements that are enabled by smart contracts. We
first outline the threat model, then develop our witnessing
system architecture, and finally describe the flow of events
in an operational scenario.
A. Threat Model
Body area networks (BAN) consist of wearable sensors
that measure vital signs of body and transmit measurements
toward a personal gateway at which the data is collected
and forwarded to the HSP through the Internet (Fig. 1). In
this paper, we focus on man-in-the-middle attackers that can
manipulate IoT data in transit from wearable sensors to the
personal gateway. The attacker could be either the owner of the
sensor itself, falsifying the medical measurements in order to
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Fig. 2. System architecture of on-demand witnessing over blockchain
claim financial benefits, or other malicious entities who aim to
harm to individual patients or the broader health-care system.
In this environment: the attacker can compromise the gateway
to forge the data measured and transmitted by the sensor;
the attacker can backfill medical data [7]; and witnesses
are independent and trusted entities which are assumed to
be not compromised – the HSP has the freedom to choose
from a number of potential witnesses that are present in the
environment.
B. System Architecture
Fig. 2 shows the system architecture of our witnessing
scheme. We now explain various entities in this architecture.
Healthcare Service Provider (HSP) is an entity, shown
on top right of Fig. 2, that provides remote health services
to patients based on the medical data received from their
body-worn sensor. The HSP receives, stores, and manages the
access to real-time medical data to provide timely support and
treatment to the patients.
Wearable IoT Sensor is an on-body low-power sensor
to measure physiological signs of the patient. The sensor
transmits the health data to a personal gateway from where
the data gets forwarded to a remote server of the HSP on the
Internet.
Witnesses, by their definition, are wireless nodes with
Internet connectivity (e.g., Witness1 and Witness2 in Fig. 2)
that locate in the physical vicinity of the wearable IoT sensor,
and share the same wireless broadcast domain. Witnesses
are able to overhear the data transmitted wirelessly by the
wearable IoT. Since the wearable data is encrypted, witnesses
are not able to extract any information from the overheard data
packets.
Blockchain Network maintains a distributed public ledger,
shared across peering nodes. Transactions between nodes get
recorded in a chronological order, and are linked to previous
ones by cryptographic mechanisms. All transactions within
a specific time period are combined into a block which is
chained (linked) to previous blocks, extending the ledger. A
new block is added to the ledger only after it is approved
by a consensus mechanism, i.e., a majority of network nodes
(aka miners) verify its validity. Traditional blockchain net-
works like Bitcoin are typically used for financial transactions
Node
(the HSP or witnesses)
Witnessing 
smart contract
Block #k
Hash(previous block)
Transaction #1
Transaction #2
….
Transaction #n
Ethereum Network
public ledger
signed by 
private key
{“from” : <nodePublicKey>,
“to” : <WitnessingSmartContract>,
“data” : {“function”:<name>, “inputs”:[inputs]},
“reward” : <$reward>}
witnessing transaction #n
Fig. 3. Witnessing transaction sent by nodes on Ethereum blockchain,
updating the state of smart contract and appending the ledger.
Request for witnessing the behavior of a target sensor (𝑆𝑖)1
Select witnesses ({𝑊𝑖𝑘}; 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁)3 Offer witnessing service (𝑂!!"; 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑁)2
Submit witness statements ({𝑆!!#}; 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁)4
HSP Witness
Fig. 4. Sequence of witnessing interactions between the HSP and potential
witnesses over blockchain.
(exchange of digital money) [26], while modern blockchains
like Ethereum serve for a wider range of customized and
programmable transactions (exchange of valuable tokens based
on smart contracts) [11]. Nodes (the HSP and witnesses) can
join a blockchain network by creating their account, consisting
of a pair of public and private keys – the private key is used
to sign transactions, and the public (their identity across the
network) will be used for verification.
Smart Contracts are special accounts that are created for
specific application (i.e., witnessing services) by a node (i.e.,
the HSP in this paper), and become available to every nodes
on the Ethereum network. Smart contracts come with a unique
identifier, and typically offer a range of functions (§III-C) that
can be called by a node which submits a transaction on the
blockchain. The access to these functions can be controlled
(e.g., available to all nodes or restricted to certain nodes) by
the node which develops and deploys the smart contract on
the blockchain.
Fig. 3 shows how a witnessing transaction is made on
the Ethereum network, updating the state of the contract
(depending on the specific function call) and ultimately getting
appended to the ledger. Each transaction consists of four
essential fields including: (a) "from" the identity of sender
node, (b) "to" the identity of the witnessing smart contract,
(c) "data" which contains of a "function" name along with
a pair of "inputs" and "outputs" that vary by function
(§III-C), and (d) "reward" offered by the caller to miners
of the blockchain to approve the witnessing transaction and
append it to the public ledger. We note that the HSP and
potential witnesses on this network are particularly interested
in the witnessing transactions (i.e., addressed to the witnessing
smart contract) of the ledger – other types of transaction may
occur on this blockchain network.
6{“function”:”request”, 
“inputs”:[{“device”:<hash(mac>,
“duration”:<time>}]
}
{“function”:”offer”, 
“inputs”:[{“eligibility”:<SSID>,
“granularity”:<num>},
“price”:<$price>},
“deadline”:<time>}]
}
{“function”:”select”, 
“inputs”:[{“witnesses”:list]
}
{“function”:”submit”, 
“inputs”:[{“statement”:<256-bit>,
}] 
}
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3 4
Fig. 5. Components of data field in witnessing transactions vary by function
type.
C. Flow of Events
Wearable sensors transmit their measured data via their
gateway to the HSP server on the Internet (shown by solid
black line in Fig. 2). Note that the data is sent over the
wireless medium on the local network (e.g., inside hospitals or
homes) to the gateway, and hence all communications between
gateway and wearable healthcare devices are overheard by
other parties in the vicinity. Man-in-the-middle attackers (with
different incentives) can intercept packets sent by the wearable
devices and may attempt to tamper the data in transit. There
are multiple adversary models [31], [32] for manipulating
data while being transmitted on the network: key management
process (between the IoT device and HSP server) can be
exploited by the man-in-the middle to access the secret key;
an attacker may also collect previous packets of the IoT device
and re-send them maliciously at later times to mount a replay
attack on the HSP. For a given environment (say, a home), we
have an IoT sensor (Si) with a personal gateway (GW i), and
multiple witnesses (Wij). Fig. 4 illustrates the flow of events
in a witnessing process that consists of a sequence of four
steps explained as follows.
Step1 Request for Witnessing: The HSP initiates the
process by invoking a function (of the smart contract) called
"request", passing two parameters namely the identity of a
target sensor (e.g., "device":<hash(mac)>), and a desired
duration of witnessing "duration":<time> for "inputs"
component of the "data" field, as shown on the top left
of Fig. 5. Note that for privacy reasons a hashed version
of the sensor’s MAC address ("hash(mac)") is publicly
announced on the network. Also, the "request" function can
only be called by the HSP node, and potential witnesses will
continuously look for this specific transaction submitted by the
HSP. Upon arrival of a witnessing request, witness nodes will
check their local network (wireless LAN) whether they are in
the vicinity of the target sensor, or not. Note that the HSP
would require witnesses to complete an eligibility challenge,
proving that they are indeed in the vicinity of the target sensor
location. The eligibility challenge has been widely studied in
the literature [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], and is beyond the
scope of this paper. That being said, wireless SSID association,
public IP subnet, or nonce packets emitted by the target sensor
can be used as a loose proof of location.
Step2 Offer Witnessing Service: Those nodes which find
themselves local to the target sensor, may choose to offer the
witnessing service depending upon their available resources
like memory, battery, or compute power. Each potential wit-
ness will respond by invoking a function of the smart contract
called "offer", passing a response to the "eligibility"
challenge (e.g., SSID), the "granularity" of their statements
(e.g., number of packets to be included per statement), the
dollar "cost" of their service, and (optional) a "deadline"
by which they aim to make their statement available on the
blockchain. Statements can only get added to the ledger if they
are approved by a majority of the blockchain miners. We note
that miners prioritize those transactions (block of transactions)
which offer higher rewards, and hence the approval of less-
rewarding transactions can get delayed.
The granularity of witness statements depends on the re-
sources such as memory, battery, and compute power that
are available on the potential witness device for generating,
transmitting, and more importantly submitting statements to
the blockchain – the higher the granularity, the more resources
needed, and thus resulting in higher price (cost) of witness-
ing. The deadline of statement depends on the load of the
blockchain network and the dollar incentive (reward) that the
sender (witness) is willing to incur. We note that a congested
network may delay the availability of statements on the ledger,
unless a higher reward is paid. The witnessing price depends
on the deadline metric plus an additional remuneration that
individual witnesses may want to receive from the HSP for
the service to be provided. This means that availing a high
granular statement in a short time from a demanding witness,
can be quite expensive for the HSP.
Step3 Witness Selection: Once the witnessing offers are
submitted by the eligible witnesses, the HSP needs to select
those which give the best quality statements subject to a
limited (dollar) budget available. Note that the HSP aims
to achieve a verification probability close to 1 for the data
transmitted by its target sensor – this objective is met when
a large number of witnesses submit fine-grained statements.
Considering the objective and constraint, the HSP selects a
set of (zero, one or more) witnesses and announces them on
the blockchain, committing to a dollar cost in exchange of the
witnessing services to be provided by those selected witness
nodes. This announcement will be made on the blockchain
network by invoking "select" function of the witnessing
smart contract. Again, the access to this function is restricted
to the HSP as the authority in charge of witness selection.
Step4 Submit Witness Statement: Once a witness node is
notified of its selection via the "select" transaction submit-
ted by the HSP, it starts overhearing the packets transmitted
by the target sensor and generates witness statements. Each of
these statements is sent onto the Ethereum network by calling
"submit" function of the smart contract. One this specific
typs of transaction is approved by the network miners, the
smart contract will automatically pay off Ethers equal to the
requested amount of "price" (in step3 ) to the witnesses from
the HSP’s account.
IV. WITNESS STATEMENTS AND
OPTIMAL WITNESS SELECTION
Once the HSP ensures that potential witnesses are in the
vicinity of its target sensor, its objective becomes to select a
7group of them that yield the best verification accuracy, given a
limited budget. In this section we first describe the structure of
witness statements, and then develop an optimization problem
of selecting witnesses.
A. Witness Statements and Verification
We consider a standard form of witness statements (with
flexible granularity) that fulfill the following requirements:
(a) not revealing any information of the sensor data, (b)
allowing the HSP to check whether a specific data packet has
been logged into the statement with some degree of certainty,
and (c) being lightweight for resource-constrained witnesses
to participate. One of the possible candidates for witness
statement is bloom filter which was employed in [9] to provide
opportunistic binding of the medical data to its context.
A bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure that is
typically used to add elements (data packets) to a set (filter)
and test if an element is in a set. Instead of the elements
themselves, a hash of them is added to the set. When testing if
an element is in the bloom filter, false positives are possible –
either an element is definitely not in the set or that it is possible
the element is in the set. An empty Bloom filter is a bit array
of M bits, all set to 0. There are also k independent hash
functions, each of which maps an element to one of the M
bit positions. To add an element, feed it to the hash functions
to get k bit positions, and set the bits at these positions to 1.
Note that with more elements embedded in the filter, the error
rate (false positive) increases. For given filter size M and the
probability of false-positive f , the number of data elements n
in the filter is determined by:
n =
−M(ln2)2
ln(f)
(1)
Also, the optimum number of hash functions needed to
generate a bloom filter of size M bits with n logged elements
is given by:
k =
M
n
ln2 (2)
For our application, each witness commits to a number of
inserted packets in each statement n (passed as granularity
in step2 ) while the size of bloom filters for all witness
statements is fixed (say, M = 256). Witnesses, therefore, may
generate and submit a number (denoted by m) of statements
based on their target false-positive probability f and the total
number of packets (denoted by N ) they have heard from the
IoT sensor.
m =
N
n
=
−Nln(f)
M(ln(2))2
(3)
On the other hand, the HSP verifies the presence of certain
packets in the submitted bloom filters by applying the same
hash functions used to generate the statement. To test if a
packet is in the filter, the HSP feeds it to the hash functions
to get k bit positions. If any of the bits at these positions is 0,
the packet definitely is not in the filter. If all are 1, then the
packet may be in the filter with the probability of 1− f . It is
important to note that a negative response from the statement
is certain since bloom filter cannot result in a false negative.
Since witnesses are independent, the verification probability
(denoted by τ ) using bloom filters submitted by W witnesses
can be derived from:
τ = 1−
W∏
i=1
fi (4)
B. Optimal Witness Selection
As discussed in §III-C ( step2 ) each potential witness offers
a price for the service requested by the HSP. This price
(denoted by α) is the sum of a reward for blockchain miners
and the remuneration expected by the potential witness. Note
that witness statements need to be approved by the blockchain
miners, and thereby get appended as a valid transaction to the
public ledger. Obviously, targeting a lower false-positive prob-
ability f requires a larger number of bloom filters (statements)
to be submitted by the witness that results in a higher price
charged to the HSP. Therefore, the cost of receiving witness
statements from a witness which commits to error probability
f at price α is given by:
c = mα =
−Nln(f)α
M(ln(2))2
(5)
Given a list of offers from W potential witnesses, each with
(fi, ci), the HSP needs to select a combination of them that
collectively give the highest verification probability (the lowest
error) subject to its budget constraint (denoted by C). This can
be formally defined as an optimization problem:
max 1−
W∏
i=1
(fi)
xi
s.t.
W∑
i=1
xici ≤ C
(6)
The objective function is maximized over xi which indicates
whether the ith witness to be selected by the HSP.
xi =
{
1 witness i is selected,
0 witness i is not selected,
(7)
In order to better analyze this optimization problem, we
consider two classes of the witnesses including: (a) “high-
class” witnesses which are powerful devices, affording more
memory and power for witnessing service (giving quality
statements at higher price), and (b) “low-class” witnesses that
are relatively low power (giving less-accurate statements at
lower price). Let us assume there exist H high-class and
L low-class potential witnesses, offering the pair of error
and cost as (fh, ch) and (fl, cl), respectively. Now, our
optimization problem becomes selecting the optimum number
of witnesses from the two classes while keeping the total cost
lower than a constant:
min fHh f
L
l
s.t. chH + clL ≤ C
H,L ∈ Z+
(8)
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Fig. 6. Dynamics of (a) verification error, and (b) total cost, as functions of the number of selected witnesses and the quality of their statements.
The optimization is performed over variables H and L,
while false-positive probabilities (fi’s) and associated costs
(ci’s) are known constants. We note that the objective function
is a monotonically decreasing non-linear function of H and L.
Intuitively, the verification error (our objective) decreases by
the number of witnesses selected, resulting in higher costs.
This trend is magnified by the quality of combined witnesses.
Fig. 6 shows the dynamics of verification error and to-
tal cost as a function of selected witnesses count – lines
indicate the quality of selection (composition of high-/low-
class witnesses). These values are computed by considering
the following assumptions: M = 256 (size of bloom filter);
N = 150 (total number of packets to be witnessed); fh = 0.15
(false-positive rate of high-class witnesses); and fl = 0.35
(false-positive rate of low-class witnesses). Given M , fh and
fl, we compute nh = 64 and nl = 117 from Eq. 1, resulting
the number of statements per witness mh = 3 and ml = 2. We
note that Ether (ETH) is the fuel for an Ethereum network. In
order to interact with the Ethereum blockchain, user nodes
need to pay to miner nodes for the computation of that
transaction. That payment is calculated in gas [38] , and gas is
always paid in ETH. From our experimental setup (explained
in §V-A), we found that submitting a 256-bit transaction
requires spending α = 2.77¢ [39]. Therefore, the price of offer
for high-class and low-class witnesses, respectively, equals to
ch = 8.31¢ and cl = 5.54¢ (from Eq. 5).
Here in Fig. 6, we consider five scenarios ranging from
selecting purely low-class witnesses (shown by solid blue
lines) to mixes of low-/high-class witnesses (shown by dashed
lines) to purely high-class witnesses (shown by solid red lines).
It can be seen that the verification probability (one minus error)
and the total cost (for the HSP) monotonically increase by the
number of witnesses. Also, improving the quality of witnesses
from “100% low-class” to “100% high-class” accelerates the
change rate (slope of lines) for both the verification error and
the total cost. For example, given 10 witnesses, the verification
error is 5×10−5 when all witnesses are chosen from the low-
class type (solid blue line in Fig. 6(a)), resulting in a total cost
of 20¢ (solid blue line in Fig. 6(b)). Improving the quality
of witnesses to high-class fraction being 50% (dashed green
lines) and 100% (solid red lines) would reduce the error by 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of low class witnesses
0
1
2
3
4
Nu
mb
er
 of
 hi
gh
 cl
as
s w
itn
es
se
s
 c
l
L+c
h
H = C 
Fig. 7. Example of feasible region and optimal point of the integer linear
programming for C = 30¢
and 4 orders of magnitude, respectively, while incurring 25%
and 50% additional cost.
We note that our optimization problem (8) is an integer
non-linear programming. Since the objective function is a log-
convex function and monotonically decreasing, its logarithmic
transformation is also convex and monotonically decreasing
[40]. This means that we can equally minimize the logarithmic
transformation of the objective function in Eq. 8. Applying
logarithmic transformation, multiplying the objective function
by −NαM(ln(2))2 and considering Eq. 5, our optimization problem
is expressed as a standard integer linear programming (ILP):
max chH + clL
s.t. chH + clL ≤ C
H,L ∈ Z+
(9)
Restricting the variables to be positive (H,L ∈ Z+) in
conjunction with having only one linear constraint with a
negative slope will result in a triangle feasible region. Now,
problem (9) is a standard ILP, which does not have a closed-
form solution [41]. We illustrate in Fig. 7 the feasible region
with a cost constraint C = 30. The dotted blue line is our
objective function and our optimal solution is the closest point
(of the grid) to this line from the triangle region below it.
In other words, the optimal solution is the combination of
witnesses that yield a cost value close to this upper bound line.
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As highlighted by the green dot in Fig. 7, our optimal solution
is obtained by selecting two high-class witnesses (H = 2) and
two low-class witnesses (L = 2).
Fig. 8 shows the output of the optimization problem (Eq. 8)
when the budget constraint varies from 0 to 120 cents.
Obviously, for a budget constraint less than cl = 5.54¢, it
becomes infeasible to find the optimal solution (no witness can
be selected). At a microscopic level, we observe that adding
to the budget may at least increase the witnesses count or their
quality. At a macroscopic level, instead, relaxing the budget
constraint would result in a larger number of witnesses (height
of stacked bars) along with an improvement in their quality
(height of red bars).
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
We now evaluate the efficacy of our solution by applying
it to real trace data. We first set up a private Ethereum
environment to deploy our smart contract and obtain the price
of submitting transactions on the blockchain network. We
next simulate our witness selection algorithm on trace data.
Though our algorithm is designed for sensor networks at
home or hospital premises, obtaining WiFi data from sufficient
households to test the algorithm at scale is very challenging. To
validate our algorithm at larger scale, we use traces taken from
the WiFi network of a multi-story building on our university
campus.
A. Experiments with Ethereum Platform
We set up a private blockchain network on a machine (with
2.5 GHz Quad-Core Intel Core i7 and 6GB of memory) using
the private Ethereum network [42] that is available for research
purposes and private business use-cases. The private Ethereum
network has the same APIs as the public Ethereum network
[43]. To interact with the blockchain network, we use the Go-
version Ethereum client (Geth v1.9.7) [42]. Also, we develop
our smart contract as an app with four functions (§III-C)
in Solidity v0.5.15. Lastly, we deploy the smart contract on
the Ethereum blockchain using the Ethereum JavaScript API
called web3.js v1.2.6 [44].
From our Ethereum testbed, we found that it requires
23, 000 gas in order to submit a witness statement of size 256
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Fig. 9. Number of high-class witnesses available around each of 31 WiFi
access points.
bits to the blockchain. The dollar value of each gas fluctuates
based on the dynamics of the crypto-currency market. At the
time of our experiments (25 January 2020), 1,000,000 gas =
0.0075 Ethereum (ETH) and 1 ETH = 160.36$ – this means
that 23000 gas is equal to α = 2.77¢ [39]. Note that witnesses
will pay an amount (proportional to the size of transactions)
for all transactions including offer and submit, but we
only consider the cost of submit transactions in our witness
selection algorithm.
B. Evaluation in a Multi-Story Building
To evaluate the efficacy of our scheme, we obtained WiFi
trace data from our University IT department. The data con-
tains session logs during a day (12:00am-11:59pm) for 31
WiFi access points (AP) located in a 5-story building. Each
record contains device MAC address (note that we have hashed
this to preserve anonymity); a unique AP name that clearly
indicates the building name, floor level, and access point ID;
time at which the device associated to/disassociated from the
AP (note that this is in minutes and therefore we do not have
sub-minute accuracy); and avg throughput indicating data rate
during the session.
To simulate our scheme, we assume that each AP (static and
powerful) represents a high-class witness and a user device
(mobile with limited compute power) represents a low-class
witness. Since APs are spread across the building, we call
the coverage area of each AP a “zone” from which user
devices connect to the AP. Obviously wireless zones overlap,
and hence for a given AP there exist a number of “neighbor
APs” within its close proximity. A witnessing scenario in this
environment is as follow. We consider our target sensor in an
AP zone with several high-class witnesses (neighbor APs) and
a number of low-class witnesses (user devices connected to
the AP). Fig. 9 shows the distribution of high-class witnesses
across 31 zones – each zone corresponds to a WiFi AP in the
building. It can be seen that each zone comprises 5 high-class
witnesses on average. This number varies in certain zones –
for example zone gap3 located at ground level covers 11 APs,
or zone 5ap1 located at level5 accommodates only one AP.
Obviously, high-class witnesses (neighbor APs) consistently
stay present within their corresponding zones, but low-class
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Fig. 10. CCDF of: (a) duration of WiFi sessions in our trace data, (b) cost of selecting “all” available witnesses across all epochs and WiFi zones, and (c)
maximum of epoch cost per zone.
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Fig. 11. Dynamics of witnessing for a low-density zone 4ap5 when optimization is not needed: (a) count of available witnesses, (b)) cost of witnessing, and
(c) verification error of witnessing.
witnesses (user devices) are mobile and hence their availability
changes over time. To get a sense of the availability of low-
class witnesses, we plot in Fig. 10(a) the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function (CCDF) of all sessions duration
in our trace. Of a total of 8263 WiFi sessions, more than
half (52%) had a duration more than 10 minutes. Therefore,
we consider a witnessing epoch to last 10 minutes. A target
wearable sensor is assumed [9] to transmit (on average) 15
packets per minute, and hence a total of N = 150 packets
will be witnessed during a witnessing epoch.
In our simulation, we divide a day into 144 distinct epochs
of 10-minute. For each epoch, we only consider those user
devices as potential low-class witnesses that remain connected
to the same zone for the whole duration of that epoch – devices
which switch their zone during the epoch are filtered out. This
means that potential witnesses are required to be in the vicinity
of the target sensor (present in the zone) during an epoch. With
this condition, 27% of sessions on average are removed per
epoch-zone – note that in three-quarters of epoch-zones less
than 40% of sessions are filtered out, while for a third of
epoch-zones all sessions persist during the epoch (no session
was filtered out).
Moreover, we note that cost constraints and pricing strategy
chosen by the HSP can be influenced by a number factors such
as the importance of data transmitted by the target sensor,
the matter of urgency for detecting security breaches, the
availability of potential witnesses, or the number of sensors
to be witnessed at scale. It is important to note that having
a generous budget for the HSP may result in selection of all
available witnesses, making the optimization unnecessary. On
the other hand, a very tight budget can make it infeasible
for the optimization algorithm to select even one low-class
witness. For this paper, we consider a simple pricing strategy
for the HSP whereby a fixed budget is pre-decided for every
epoch, and all epochs are treated equally – more sophisticated
strategies can explored in future works.
Recall from §IV-A, selecting a witness would cost ch =
8.31¢ for the high-class and cl = 5.54¢ for the low-class,
given α = 2.77¢ (computed from our Ethereum testbed in
§V-A) and N = 150 packets transmitted by the target sensor
over a 10-minute epoch. Note that the number of witnesses
(both high-class and low-class) during each epoch is known,
and hence the incurred cost incurred of selecting all available
witnesses (in a given zone) can be computed. Fig. 10(b) shows
the CCDF of cost per epoch during day-time (i.e., 8am-5pm
when user devices are likely present) across all zones. We
observe that for a given zone/epoch there is an 80% chance
to have the cost more than 50¢, when the HSP chooses to
select all available witnesses in the sensor environment. Note
that some zones get more crowded than others depending on
their location (meeting rooms, study spaces, offices, research
labs, or entry/exit points) in the building. We computed
the maximum cost of each zone across epochs of the day.
Fig. 10(c) shows the CCDF of maximum cost per zone. We
observe that for a third of zones (low-density ones) the cost
is always below 90¢, hence for these zones the HSP may
prefer to go with all available witnesses in the environment
without employing the optimization algorithm. We, therefore,
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Fig. 12. Dynamics of witnessing for a high-density zone 4ap2 when optimization is needed: (a) count of available witnesses, (b) count of selected witnesses,
(c) cost of witnessing, and (d) verification error of witnessing.
set the budget constraint to a fixed value equals to 90¢ in our
simulations, highlighting the fact that the optimization may
be needed in two-third of the zones (high-density ones) where
there likely be a large number of mobile devices available to
perform witnessing.
Given the budget constraint, we now simulate our scheme
during the whole 24 hours in two representative zones: a low-
density (AP 4ap5) and a high-density (AP 4ap2). Fig. 11
shows the dynamics of witnessing (number of witnesses, cost,
and verification error) for the low-density zone. It is seen
in Fig. 11(a) that this zone accommodates two high-class
witnesses (shown by a flat dashed red line) and up to 6 low-
class witnesses (mostly 1-3 during working hours as shown
by dotted blue lines). For this low-density environment, no
optimization is needed since the total cost of selecting all
available witnesses is well below the budget constraint 90¢,
and hence all available witnesses are selected. We observe
in Fig. 11(b) that the highest cost is about 54¢ for epochs
between 10am-11:30am when the total count of witnesses
reaches to its maximum of 8. As a result, the lowest veri-
fication error becomes identical to the optimal verification, as
shown in Fig. 11(c) – the lowest error of 10−4 can be achieved
at the cost of 54¢ per epoch during the peak time of this zone.
Moving to the high-density zone which hosts 6 high-class
witnesses and 5-24 low-class witnesses during day time, as
shown in Fig. 12(a). The HSP now needs to run the opti-
mization algorithm for selecting the optimal combination of
witnesses available in the environment. We observe that during
early morning (12am-9am), selecting all available witnesses
results a cost less than the constraint 90¢, as shown in
Fig. 12(c). Following 9am, it is seen that the cost is saturated
at 90¢ as a result of optimization. Focusing on optimization
results, we observe that two-third of high-class witnesses
are left out due to abundance of low-class witnesses during
busy epochs (around 12pm and closer to 5pm), as shown in
Fig. 12(b). In this scenario, the optimum verification error
would be higher than the lowest error as shown in Fig. 12(d)
– during the peak time the best error 10−8 is achieved by
selecting 2 high-class and 13 low-class witnesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an on-demand and dis-
tributed scheme to verify healthcare IoT data. Our architecture
provides the motivation and means to engage via smart con-
tracts on a blockchain: Health authorities can request witness
statements needed for data verification of target sensors;
local witness devices can monetize their statements without
compromising their privacy. We developed an optimization al-
gorithm for health authorities to select an optimal collection of
available witnesses to achieve the best verification probability
subject a budget constraint. We simulated our algorithm on real
data captured from Wi-Fi connections in a multi-story campus
building to show that a verification probability of more than
99.99% can be achieved at cost of less than two dollars for
one-hour witnessing service. This work is the first step towards
12
on-demand witnessing of sensors network data, applicable to
real-world scenarios.
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